Loss Sharing Rules for Bank Holding Companies: An Assessment of the Federal Reserve's Source-of-Strength Policy and the FDIC's Cross Guarantee Authority by Bradley, Christine & Jones, Kenneth D.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Loss Sharing Rules for Bank Holding
Companies: An Assessment of the
Federal Reserve’s Source-of-Strength
Policy and the FDIC’s Cross Guarantee
Authority
Christine Bradley and Kenneth D. Jones
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
November 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14116/
MPRA Paper No. 14116, posted 17. March 2009 04:56 UTC
Loss Sharing Rules for Bank Holding Companies: An 
Assessment of the Federal Reserve’s Source-of-Strength 
Policy and the FDIC’s Cross Guarantee Authority
By Christine M. Bradley and Kenneth D. Jones
Christine M. Bradley, Senior Policy Analyst
Mailing Address: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Division of Insurance and Research, 
550 17th St., NW., Washington, D.C. 20429
Phone: (202) 898-8951
Email Address: cbradley@fdic.gov
Kenneth D. Jones, Senior Financial Economist
Mailing Address: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Division of Insurance and Research, 




In this article, we critically examine two policies designed to protect the deposit insurance 
funds—the Federal Reserve Board’s source-of-strength policy and the FDIC’s cross-guarantee 
authority.  We discuss why each of the policies was adopted and how effective each has been in 
practice since its implementation.  We then evaluate the future application and usefulness of the 
two policies in light of the structural changes that have resulted from industry consolidation and 
the financial modernization of the 1990s.
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Assessment of the Federal Reserve’s Source-of-Strength 
Policy and the FDIC’s Cross Guarantee Authority
During the savings and loan and banking crises of the 1980s and early 1990s, the costs of 
resolving the nearly 3,000 thrift and commercial bank failures exceeded the financial resources 
that were readily available to the federal deposit insurance system.  Eventually the costs of 
resolving failed institutions would lead to the collapse of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation (FSLIC) and the near insolvency of the bank insurance fund.1  In the face of the 
crises and their associated costs, federal banking regulators and Congress began seeking ways to 
protect the deposit insurance system by forcing the industry to share the burden of failure-related 
losses.  On the regulatory side, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) extended its longstanding 
position that a bank holding company serve as a source-of-strength to its subsidiary banks
beyond the application process.  Under the expanded policy, the FRB required that a holding 
company stand ready to provide troubled subsidiaries with both financial and managerial 
assistance in times of stress.  On the legislative side, Congress responded to the crises in 1989 by 
enacting the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), which 
introduced a “cross-guarantee” provision that authorized the FDIC to hold commonly controlled 
depository institutions liable for any losses the FDIC suffered as a result of the insolvency of an 
affiliated depository institution.2  
The intent of these efforts was to curb moral-hazard behavior by assigning losses to bank 
shareholders who might otherwise be protected under traditional corporate law.3  The source of 
strength and the cross-guarantee provision were intended to decrease the likelihood that holding 
companies would be able to consolidate losses in a failing insured institution at the same time 
that both the holding company and any other affiliates remained profitable.
3Since those days of crisis, the banking industry has undergone an unprecedented structural 
transformation whereby the number of banking organizations has dropped by half and the bulk of 
the industry’s assets are held by less than 20 extremely large institutions.  Additionally, 
deregulatory efforts and initiatives to modernize the banking industry have freed the industry 
from many restrictive laws and regulations while expanding the list of permissible banking 
activities.  Notwithstanding the historic transformation of the banking system, the instruments 
available to the bank regulatory agencies relating to failed-bank resolutions remains virtually 
unchanged since the passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
(FDICIA) in 1991.  In light of the formal and functional changes in banking, the effectiveness of 
the source-of-strength policy and the cross-guarantee authority should be reevaluated.
In this article, we review each of the policies including the rationale for their adoption, the 
intended legal scope and framework, and an evaluation of the key applications of those policies.  
In particular, we review the extent to which each policy has withstood legal challenges.  We then 
evaluate the future application and usefulness of the two policies in light of the two major 
changes in banking since the policies were adopted: the structural changes that have resulted 
from industry consolidation, and the financial modernization of the 1990s.
The Source-of-Strength Policy in Theory and in Practice
The FRB first began applying its source-of-strength policy in the 1960s on a case-by-case basis 
as bank holding companies sought FRB approval to acquire member banks.4  In these cases, the 
FRB stated that it would not approve an application by a BHC to make an acquisition or 
participate in a merger if the BHC did not have sufficient financial and managerial resources to 
serve as a source of strength for the new bank.  In 1978, the Supreme Court upheld the FRB’s 
authority to deny a BHC’s application on this basis.5
The FRB codified the source of strength policy in 19846 and, in a 1987 policy statement,
extended it beyond the formal application process.  In the policy statement, the FRB asserted that 
4a BHC has an obligation to “use available resources to provide adequate capital funds to its 
subsidiary banks during periods of financial stress or adversity.”7  To meet this obligation, BHCs 
must maintain financial flexibility, including the capacity to raise capital and obtain additional 
resources as needed.  In 1989, the FRB’s then Vice Chairman, Manuel Johnson, provided 
clarification stating that a BHC should “serve as a source of strength to its banks even at the 
expense of holding company creditors and non-bank business.  The holding company should 
have to do whatever it takes to keep its banks adequately capitalized.”8
The SOS Policy’s Application in Theory
Under the expanded source of strength policy, the FRB maintains that it has regulatory authority 
to require the holding company to use any or all of its capital, even that held in a nonbank 
subsidiary, to support a bank subsidiary should that subsidiary become undercapitalized.9  
Conceivably the holding company can even be required to raise additional capital or divest itself 
of one or more subsidiaries to restore the capital adequacy of a troubled bank subsidiary.
A simple example will illustrate the application of the expanded source-of-strength policy.  
Consider the structure of a hypothetical multibank holding company (MBHC) with full 
ownership of two banking subsidiaries and one nonbank financial subsidiary (see tables 1A and 
1B).  At the consolidated level, the MBHC has $200 million of capital.  
Suppose that the lead bank subsidiary (Bank A) experiences losses in its loan portfolio and has to 
write off $200 million of bad loans (see tables 2A and 2B).  On the balance sheet, Bank A’s total 
assets will fall to $9,800 million, with a corresponding decline in total equity capital of $200 
million (equity = assets minus liabilities)—leaving a regulatory capital shortfall in the lead bank 
of $100 million.  At the holding company level, this chain of events causes a corresponding 
decline in bank equity capital of $200 million and reduces total capital at the holding company 
level to zero.
Under its source-of-strength policy, the FRB can require the BHC to recapitalize its lead bank 
subsidiary.  In this example, there are a number of ways in which recapitalization can be 
5accomplished.  The BHC may, for example, liquidate its investments and downstream $100 
million in return for an increased equity position in Bank A.  Doing this will restore the bank’s 
capital level to the regulatory minimum.  Alternatively, the holding company may shift capital 
from its healthy banking and nonbank subsidiaries to the undercapitalized lead bank to make up 
the shortfall.  One way to accomplish this would be to have the healthy subsidiaries declare a 
dividend payable to the BHC, which then downstreams the money to Bank A and books an 
increased equity interest. If the BHC is unable to find the necessary capital within the holding 
company structure, the FRB can even require the holding company to raise additional capital by 
selling equity or debt to recapitalize the lead bank.  
The public-policy interest inherent in requiring BHCs to support their subsidiary banks is based 
on the argument that a BHC derives benefits from the ownership of an institution that holds 
federally insured deposits.  The FRB maintains that the protections afforded insured institutions 
reflect important governmental concerns regarding the critical fiduciary responsibilities of 
depository institutions— as custodians of depositors’ funds—as well as their strategic role within 
the U.S. economy (as operators of the payment system and impartial providers of credit).10  
Although the FRB views its source-of-strength policy as necessary for maintaining the safety of 
the financial system, the policy is controversial.  Some critics argue that the policy—by 
impairing managerial flexibility—prevents holding company management from acting in the best 
interests of shareholders and possibly even requires management to violate its fiduciary duty to 
shareholders of the corporation.11  Critics also argue that the policy imposes unlimited liability 
on parent holding companies in contradiction of the protections traditionally provided under U.S. 
corporate law.12  Finally, others contend that the policy poses a substantial disincentive to the 
integration of banking and commerce in the United States13 and impairs a bank or bank holding 
company’s ability to attract capital.14
The SOS Policy in Practice: Legal Challenges and Legislative Action
To date, the limited evidence available suggests that the source of strength policy has been 
effective within the application process.  Ashcraft (2004) finds that distressed banks within a 
6MBHC are more likely to receive capital injections from their parents and recover from distress 
more quickly than either independent banks or a bank that is part of a one-bank holding 
company.  This finding was even more pronounced for banks that were members of an 
expanding MBHC—one that had acquired a banking institution within the last year.15  
Although the evidence suggests that the source of strength policy is effective at the application 
stage, expansion of the policy beyond the application process has been hamstrung by a series of 
legal challenges.  The first major court case dealing with the legality of the FRB’s expanded 
policy occurred in October 1988, when the FRB ordered MCorp, a multibillion-dollar BHC in 
Texas, to “implement . . . an acceptable capital plan that would ensure that all of MCorp’s 
available assets are used to recapitalize the Subsidiary Banks that are suffering capital 
deficiencies.”16  MCorp failed to comply.  In March 1989, the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) declared 20 of MCorp’s 25 subsidiary banks insolvent and ordered them closed.17  
Subsequently, MCorp filed for bankruptcy and asked the court to enjoin the FRB from taking 
any administrative action to enforce its source of strength policy while the bankruptcy case 
proceeded.18  The district court ruled in favor of the holding company.19  The FRB appealed the 
ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
In May 1990, the Fifth Circuit ruled that although the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) 
grants the FRB the power to exercise control over the formation, structure, and operation of 
BHCs and their nonbank subsidiaries during the application process, it “does not grant the 
[FRB] authority to consider the financial and managerial soundness of the subsidiary banks after 
it approves the application.”20  Further, the court ruled that requiring the BHC to transfer assets 
to its failing subsidiary could “hardly be considered consistent with generally accepted standards 
of prudent operation” and would amount to “a wasting of the holding company’s assets in 
violation of its duty to its shareholders”; requiring such a transfer of funds would cause MCorp 
to disregard its own corporate status.21
The FRB appealed the Fifth Circuit’s ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court 
sidestepped the question of whether the expanded scope of the source-of-strength policy was 
enforceable.  Instead, the Court found that the lower courts lacked jurisdiction.22  As a result of 
7the Supreme Court’s action, the Fifth Circuit’s rejection of the FRB’s policy is not controlling on 
future courts.  Shortly after the Supreme Court’s ruling, the FRB dropped its case against 
MCorp, stating that the holding company had downstreamed $17 million in capital to its 
subsidiary banks as called for by the Board of Governors’ source-of-strength policy.  As a 
consequence of the MCorp case, the legal enforceability of the FRB’s expanded source-of-
strength policy was left unsettled.
With the passage of FDICIA in 1991, however, Congress acknowledged that a holding company 
has at least a limited continuing responsibility for its banking subsidiaries.  Under the Prompt 
Corrective Action (PCA) provisions of FDICIA, Congress requires any undercapitalized insured 
depository institution to submit a capital restoration plan to its federal banking regulator.  The 
law further prescribes that “each company having control of the institution” must guarantee the 
compliance of the undercapitalized institution.23  In contrast to a holding company’s potentially
unlimited liability under the FRB’s source-of-strength policy, Congress limited a BHC’s 
responsibility under FDICIA to the lesser amount of 5 percent of the depository institution’s 
assets at the time the institution became undercapitalized or the amount needed by the insured 
depository institution to bring it into compliance with applicable capital standards.24  In the 
example of the hypothetical holding company discussed above (see tables 2A and 2B), the 
holding company’s liability would be limited to $100 million—the amount needed to bring Bank 
A into compliance—since this amount is less than 5 percent of the bank’s $9.8 billion of assets.
Although some observers have viewed the PCA provisions of FDICIA as weakening the FRB’s 
source-of-strength policy both by outlining when a holding company is required to support its 
banking subsidiaries and by limiting the amount of its responsibilities,25 in August 1992 the FRB 
made clear that it did not view PCA as constraining its use of the source-of-strength policy.  The 
FRB stated that a holding company has a “responsibility to act as a source of financial strength” 
to its banking subsidiary and is required “to use its assets, including its cash and other short-term, 
liquid, investment grade assets, to provide whatever additional capital support” may be required 
by the Board.26  The FRB continues to hold this position.27
8The Cross-Guarantee Authority in Theory and in Practice
In August 1989, Congress included in FIRREA a provision (known as the cross-guarantee 
provision) that authorizes the FDIC to unilaterally assess an insured depository institution within 
a bank holding company—but only an insured depository institution—for losses that the FDIC 
has incurred (or expects to incur) in connection with the failure of an affiliated institution that is 
commonly controlled.28  In other words, the FDIC is allowed to draw upon the resources of a 
corporate family of banks (but not those of nonbanks within the corporate family) in order to 
fund the resolution of one of the family’s banking affiliates—in essence, the FDIC is allowed to 
treat the banks within a multibank holding company as if they were a single institution.  
Commonly controlled insured depository institutions can also be assessed liability for losses that 
the FDIC “reasonably anticipates” incurring in connection with any assistance provided to any 
affiliated insured institutions that are “in danger of default.”
But, the purpose of FIRREA’s cross-guarantee provision was not solely to reduce the costs 
incurred by the FDIC in resolving failed institutions.  The provision was also intended to provide 
an incentive for holding company management to monitor bank risk taking, and as a means of 
preventing a holding company from consolidating losses in a single institution and allowing it to 
fail so that its losses accrue to the deposit insurance fund and not the holding company or the 
remaining bank subsidiaries.
The Cross-Guarantee Authority in Theory
The theoretical differences between the cross-guarantee provision and the source-of-strength 
policy can be illustrated by reference to our hypothetical bank holding company example.  Under 
the expanded source-of-strength policy, the FRB can potentially require the holding company to 
use all of its capital ($200 million at the holding company level) to support any ailing subsidiary 
bank before the failure of the bank.  The holding company may even be required to raise 
additional capital from outside investors.  In contrast, the FDIC’s cross-guarantee authority 
9cannot be invoked until a subsidiary bank fails.  If a failure occurs, the FDIC can then assess a 
liability against the surviving bank affiliates—but only against the affiliated banks and not 
against the holding company or other nonbank affiliates.
Suppose, for example, that the lead bank (Bank A) in our hypothetical bank holding company 
example fails.  The FDIC can assess the surviving bank affiliate (Bank B) for the losses expected 
to accrue from Bank A’s failure.  Assuming the FDIC expects losses from the failure to be near 
the historical average (about 5 percent of assets for banks of this size), the assessment would be 
about $500 million.
This amount exceeds the total equity capital in the affiliated bank subsidiary (Bank B) by a 
sizable margin, so such an assessment will lead to the failure of Bank B.  With the failure of 
Bank B, the parent holding company will lose all its bank equity capital (originally $1 billion),
and the FDIC will assume control and ownership of all the remaining assets of the two bank 
subsidiaries.  With the loss of its two bank subsidiaries, the bank holding company’s liabilities 
will exceed its assets by $800 million, and the probability of bankruptcy will be high.  If 
bankruptcy should occur, the shareholders and creditors of the holding company would be at risk 
of losing much of their investments.
With regard to the FDIC, if we assume that the lead bank (Bank A) is closed when its capital 
level reaches 2 percent (as required under PCA rules), approximately $200 million of equity 
capital will remain in the bank.  Combining this with the capital in the healthy Bank B ($100 
million), the FDIC might expect to recover about $300 million—a sizable amount but not 
sufficient to offset the $500 million in expected losses from the failure of Bank A.  Nevertheless, 
by using its cross-guarantee authority, the FDIC will be able to recover $100 million in this 
hypothetical example, or about 20 percent of its expected losses, from the healthy affiliate.  But 
if the smaller bank subsidiary fails instead of the larger, assessing a cross-guarantee liability 
against the lead bank subsidiary will allow the FDIC (theoretically, at least) to fully recover any 
losses it might incur.
10
In its capacity as a bank supervisor, deposit insurer, and receiver of failed depository institutions, 
the FDIC pursues a number of objectives.   Historically, the FDIC’s primary objective has been 
to maintain public confidence in, and the stability of, the banking system.  However, the FDIC is 
also concerned with maintaining market discipline to prevent excessive risk taking by banks;
pursuing the least-costly failure-resolution method; choosing resolution methods that are 
consistent and equitable; minimizing disruption to the communities where failures occur; and 
minimizing the government’s role in owning, financing, and managing financial institutions and 
financial assets.29  The challenge faced by the FDIC is deciding how to balance these objectives 
with the inherent trade-offs in any given situation.  
Suppose the FDIC is faced with a bank failure in which it may invoke its cross-guarantee power.  
The FDIC can choose to impose a full assessment against the affiliates of the failed bank.  This 
decision is fully consistent with the maintenance of market discipline.  If, however, the 
assessment triggers the failure of affiliated banks, the FDIC may conclude that the costs of 
additional bank failures, including the possible economic disruption to the local community and 
the costs to the FDIC in managing the resolution of the failed banks’ assets outweigh any funds 
that would be received as a result issuing the cross-guarantee assessment.30  Recognizing these 
competing objectives, the FDIC has not always chosen to issue a cross-guarantee assessment.
The Cross-Guarantee Authority in Practice
In March 1988, before FIRREA was passed, the FDIC loaned the two lead banks of First 
RepublicBank Corporation (First Republic) $1 billion in open-bank assistance conditioned on the 
banks’ procuring loan guarantees from their affiliates (in all there were 40 affiliated banks in the 
holding company).  In July 1988, First Republic’s lead bank was declared insolvent and the 
FDIC called the loan guarantees—with the result that all the remaining bank affiliates failed.31  
After witnessing the fate of the First Republic banks, other holding companies refused the 
FDIC’s proposals for recapitalization assistance agreements using similar interbank loan 
guarantees (MCorp being prominent among them).  Soon it was apparent to the FDIC that its 
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attempts to assign losses to shareholders of failing bank affiliates would not be effective without 
explicit legal powers that enable it to force cross-guarantee loss assessments.
Congress granted the FDIC its cross-guarantee authority as part of FIRREA, which became 
effective in August 1989.  In the same month that its cross-guarantee authority became effective, 
the FDIC issued a notice of assessment for $5.3 million to the First National Bank of Canton in
Canton, Texas.  The assessment was to cover estimated losses accruing to the FDIC from the 
failure of the First State Bank in Pflugerville, Texas—an affiliated institution that was commonly 
controlled by the bank holding company, TransTexas Bancshares, Inc.  The assessment exceeded 
the capital of the FNB of Canton, but rather than close the bank, the FDIC waived the liability in 
order to preserve the value of a promissory note previously issued by TransTexas Bancshares.  In 
an ironic twist, the FDIC found itself (through a previous but unrelated failure resolution) 
holding a 51 percent interest in the proceeds from a pending sale of that promissory note.  On the 
basis of staff’s analysis, the FDIC concluded that the proceeds from the note sale (even at a 
steeply discounted price) were greater than the potential recovery from the sale or liquidation of 
an insolvent FNB of Canton.  Hence, it granted a waiver releasing FNB of Canton from its cross-
guarantee liability.32
Other failures that met the criteria for application of the cross-guarantee provision quickly 
followed.  Indeed, since the enactment of FIRREA in August 1989, the FDIC Board of Directors 
considered more than 40 cases involving cross-guarantee liabilities.  The bulk of these cases 
occurred prior to 1994 (coinciding with the end of the U.S. banking crisis) and involved 
applications for waivers or exemptions from actual or potential cross-guarantee liabilities.  In 
only 11 cases did the FDIC formally assess a cross-guarantee liability against the surviving 
affiliate(s) of a failed bank.  These 11 cases are shown in Appendix Table B.1.  The table 
includes the name of the parent holding company, the name of the bank whose failure caused a 
cross-guarantee to be applicable, the subsidiary banks involved, the date of the initial failure, the 
original loss estimate for each failure, the amount of the cross-guarantee assessment, the amount 
of any payment made to satisfy that assessment, and the final loss to the bank insurance fund.
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Among the cases listed in the Appendix-Table B.1, the total estimated loss to the FDIC from the 
failures that triggered cross-guarantee assessments was approximately $2.0 billion.33  This 
amount also represents the total potential liability of the insured institutions that were deemed 
subject to the cross-guarantee provision.  But total actual assessments levied in these cases 
amounted to only about $1.7 billion.  Actual assessments often differed from the initial loss 
estimates because once the FDIC was appointed receiver, it was better able to assess a failing 
institution’s financial condition and potential losses under different resolution scenarios.  
Eventually the FDIC received about $652.6 million in cross-guarantee payments from the 
institutions (or their receiverships) against which it had assessed a liability.  This amount 
represents about a third (31.9 percent) of the total potential liability and slightly more than a third 
(38.8 percent) of the actual assessments levied.  The full amount of the cross-guarantee 
assessment has been paid (or recovered) in only three cases: Premier Bancshares of Texas ($1.3 
million), Southeast Banking Corporation ($143 million), and First City Corporation ($470 
million).  In the end, the ultimate cost to the FDIC attributable to these 11 cases was still about 
$2.8 billion.  It should be noted, however, that this final loss number encompassed all costs, 
including the FDIC’s administrative, legal, and overhead costs (and during the banking crisis, all 
of these were substantial).
The fact that, in these cases, the FDIC was able to recover only about a third of its losses through 
cross-guarantee assessments is not surprising.  Many bank holding companies at the time were 
facing severe financial challenges.  In fact, in some cases all the affiliated banks within a holding 
company were found to be in such poor condition that the FDIC determined that little, if 
anything, would be gained by issuing a cross-guarantee assessment against the surviving 
affiliates.  Several such cases are described in the Appendix Table B.2, which includes all cases 
where a failure triggered the cross-guarantee provision but the FDIC chose not to make a formal 
assessment (the table also includes, for illustrative purposes, several cases from Table B.1).  For 
example, in the cases of Northway, Schreiner, and United Bancshares, the FDIC found the 
remaining subsidiary banks in the holding companies to be in extremely poor health, with little 
or no recovery value.  Either the banks failed before the FDIC could take action, or the FDIC 
determined that if the banks were left to fail of their own accord, the deposit insurance fund 
13
would incur no additional losses.  In other cases (for example, BancTexas Group and the 
National Bancshares of Texas), the FDIC used its discretionary authority under the law to grant 
an institution a waiver from cross-guarantee liability in order to facilitate a sale or 
recapitalization (or both) of the institution.  Indeed, this latter strategy proved to be particularly
important in the FDIC’s efforts to minimize losses to the bank insurance fund.
Appendix-Table B.3 presents all cases in which the FDIC Board granted a depository institution 
or a holding company a waiver or an exemption from a pending or potential cross-guarantee 
liability.  In exchange for the waiver, the FDIC was able to facilitate the sale or recapitalization 
of the institution or holding company.  For example, in the four cases involving MBanks 
(surviving bank subsidiaries of MCorp’s failure in March 1989), the FDIC was able to use the 
existence of outstanding cross-guarantee liability to leverage capital contributions from the banks 
or bank holding companies that wished to acquire one of the MBank franchises.  Using this 
strategy, the FDIC obtained capital injections totaling $34.8 million in the four MBank cases.  In 
the 24 cases listed in Appendix-Table B.3, the FDIC was able to use the waiver-granting process 
to secure capital commitments of more than $700 million.  By facilitating the sale of troubled 
institutions, the FDIC avoided millions of dollars in additional losses to the insurance fund.
The Cross-Guarantee Authority in Practice: Legal Challenges
Before the enactment of FIRREA’s cross-guarantee provision, common ownership of depository 
institutions would not have resulted in one bank’s being held liable for the debts of an affiliated 
bank.  U.S. corporate law traditionally recognizes that a corporate structure establishes a separate 
identity (and limited liability) for each subsidiary—a “corporate veil” through which a 
corporation’s liability is limited to its investment in the subsidiary.  Hence, before FIRREA there 
was no legal basis for fear on the part of affiliates of a multibank holding company that the 
corporate veil could be pierced and that each affiliate could be held responsible for the debts of 
another, or that the debts of a sister bank might result in the closure of both.  
Given this history, it is not surprising that the FDIC’s use of its cross-guarantee authority has 
been challenged in court.  Between 1991 and 1994, four cases were filed in federal district courts 
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challenging either the constitutionality of the cross-guarantee provision or its application to a 
specific case.  These suits arose from the failures of the Bank of New England and the Southeast 
Bank in 1991, the second failure of the First City Corporation in 1992, and the failure of Central 
Bank of Meriden in 1994. 34
In 1991 the FDIC used its cross-guarantee authority to recoup losses resulting from the failure of 
the Bank of New England (BNE).  When BNE failed, the FDIC estimated that the cost to the 
deposit insurance fund would be more than $1 billion.  The FDIC then assessed an affiliate of 
BNE, the Maine National Bank (MNB), the full amount of the estimated loss.  Immediately 
before the assessment, MNB had been a healthy bank with an estimated net worth of 
approximately $65 million.  But because the FDIC’s assessment far exceeded MNB’s assets, the 
bank was closed by the Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC was appointed as its 
receiver.35  MNB challenged the FDIC in court, asserting that the cross-guarantee provision 
amounted to an “uncompensated taking” in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution—claiming, that is, that enforcing the cross-guarantee provision amounted to a 
taking of private property for public use without just compensation.  After five years of 
litigation, the courts eventually validated the FDIC’s authority to exercise its rights under the 
cross-guarantee provision, soundly rejecting the per se takings analysis and its conclusion that 
the cross-guarantee authority was a radical departure from the common-law principle of limited 
corporate liability.36
The FDIC’s cross-guarantee authority was also challenged in a case involving the Meriden Trust 
and Safe Deposit Company in Meriden, Connecticut—an affiliated bank in Cenvest, a two-bank 
holding company.  Following the July 1994 failure of Central Bank, the lead bank in Cenvest, 
the FDIC assessed its liabilities (estimated at $152 million) against Meriden Trust.  Meriden 
Trust appealed the FDIC’s action, arguing that the cross-guarantee provisions of FIRREA 
constituted an uncompensated taking.  On August 2, 1995, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit issued a decision that affirmed the constitutionality of the cross-guarantee 
provision and the legal right of the FDIC to assess Meriden Trust for its losses.  After the court 
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decision, the FDIC placed Meriden Trust in receivership and recovered $7.8 million on the sale 
of the bridge bank.
The net result of these legal challenges is that the constitutionality of the cross-guarantee 
provision is now firmly established in case law.  Going forward, the FDIC is not likely to have 
its authority challenged again on constitutional grounds.
The Effects of Financial Modernization on Source of Strength and Cross-Guarantee
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the banking industry began to recover from the crises.  The number 
of failures dropped dramatically while the industry as a whole returned to profitability.  The 
improved financial environment allowed for a change of priorities in Congress and a renewed 
push for the modernization and liberalization of the nation’s banking laws.  
As part of these efforts, Congress passed the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act (Riegle-Neal) in 1994 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act 
(GLBA) in 1999.  Riegle-Neal permits banks and bank holding companies to purchase banks or 
establish subsidiaries across state lines.  In effect, it allows banks to operate across state lines 
without the need for a holding company structure.  The enactment of Riegle-Neal did much to 
further the consolidation and improve the efficiency of the banking industry.  Following Riegle-
Neal, GLBA repealed the Depression-era laws that had restricted affiliations among banks, 
securities firms, insurance companies, and other financial service providers.
More specifically, GLBA had a goal of “enhanc[ing] competition in the financial services 
industry by providing a prudential framework for the affiliation of banks, securities firms, 
insurance companies, and other financial service providers. . . .”37  Under GLBA, the mixing of 
banking and other financial services must be contained within a new corporate structure—a 
financial holding company (FHC).  An FHC can own a bank in addition to a company that 
engages in securities underwriting or dealing, insurance agency and underwriting, merchant 
banking or venture capital activities, the distribution of mutual funds, or securities lending (or 
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any activity that the FRB determines to be financial in nature or incidental to a financial 
activity).38  Simply put, GLBA permits bankers, insurers, and brokers to affiliate and house their 
diversified businesses in an FHC.  On March 13, 2000, the first business day after the FHC 
provisions of GLBA became effective, the FRB approved the applications of 117 BHCs to 
become FHCs.39  By September 30, 2005, 485 reporting BHCs had been approved as FHCs.  In 
total, these FHCs held 86.1 percent of all BHC assets.  (Table 3 gives the number and assets of 
reporting BHCs and FHCs from year-end 2000 through year-end 2005.)
Financial Modernization and the Source-of- Strength Policy
Although GLBA established the Federal Reserve Board as the umbrella supervisor of FHCs, it 
also imposed certain limits on the FRB’s powers, including limits on the application of the 
source-of-strength policy.40  Under GLBA, the FRB cannot require a bank holding company with 
a functionally regulated subsidiary that is a licensed insurance company, registered broker-
dealer, registered investment company, or registered adviser to fund or provide capital to an 
affiliated depository institution if the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), or a state insurance authority advises the 
FRB that such funding would materially and adversely affect the company.  In other words, the 
FRB cannot enforce its source-of-strength policy against functionally regulated subsidiaries 
without the approval of the functional regulator (the SEC, the CFTC, or the state insurance 
authority).41  As former FRB Chairman Greenspan recognized, with the passage of GLBA 
“Congress has placed real and effective limits on the Federal Reserve’s authority to supervise 
and regulate functionally regulated entities.”42
Finally, as noted above in the section on legal challenges and legislative action regarding the 
source-of-strength policy, the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) provision of FDICIA limited the 
liability of a parent company (when guaranteeing the capital restoration plan of an insured 
institution) to whichever was less: 5 percent of the depository institution’s total assets at the time 
the institution becomes undercapitalized, or the amount necessary to bring the institution into
compliance with capital standards.  Although that PCA provision has never been tested in 
practice, it appears that unlimited liability has effectively been ended under the source-of-
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strength policy.  When one considers the GLBA limitation in combination with the legal 
obstacles discussed earlier, it can be argued that the force and effectiveness of the FRB’s policy 
outside the application process has been eroded.  Financial modernization legislation over the 
last decade has placed limits both on the extent of a holding company’s liability and, in the case 
of a financial holding company, on the FRB’s unilateral authority to require support.  However, 
an alternative interpretation might be that the PCA provisions of FDICIA actually strengthened 
the source-of-strength policy by codifying at least a weak version of it into law. 
Financial Modernization and Cross-Guarantees
With regard to cross-guarantees, GLBA did not reduce the FDIC’s authority to impose a cross-
guarantee assessment.  Neither, however, did it expand the FDIC’s authority.  For example, 
House Banking Committee Chairman Henry B. Gonzalez introduced legislation in 1991 that 
would have expanded the cross-guarantee provisions to make the nonbanking subsidiaries of 
bank holding companies equally liable for the losses incurred by the FDIC in the event of the 
insolvency of an affiliated bank.43  This legislation was never passed and the FDIC’s cross-
guarantee authority remained limited to cases involving banking affiliates of a multibank holding 
company.  
With the passage of the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act in 2006, Congress expanded 
the cross-guarantee authority to include insured financial institutions that are members of 
nonbanking holding companies.44 As a consequence, the FDIC’s cross-guarantee authority is 
now applicable to affiliated insured financial institutions that are members of nonbank holding 
companies as well (for example, credit card banks, trust companies or industrial loan 
companies).  Despite the expansion of the cross-guarantee authority, an assessment of the likely 
future effectiveness of the cross-guarantee begins with the current status of MBHCs.  .
MBHCs were originally formed to circumvent the prohibitions against bank branching that 
existed until 1994, when Congress passed the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act.  Because Riegle-Neal preempted state banking regulations and created a 
nationwide standard for interstate expansion by both national and state banks, it was expected to 
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lead to a decline in the importance of MBHCs.45  As of year-end 2005, there were 522 MBHCs, 
compared with 973 in 1988 (Table 4), but in contrast to the falling numbers, the assets held by 
MBHCs have been steadily increasing in both nominal and real dollars (Figure 1).  In 2005, 
MBHCs held over $6 trillion (or 65 percent) of all assets held by insured institutions.
MBHCs have also experienced an internal realignment of activities within the multibank holding 
company structure, which may have implications for the FDIC’s cross-guarantee authority going 
forward.  As Figure 2 indicates, the percentage of holding company assets that are held by the 
lead bank in an MBHC has grown significantly since 1994.  Indeed, at year-end 2005, lead banks 
held nearly 84 percent of MBHC assets, compared with 65 percent in 1986.  In 1986, the average 
MBHC had about $3.1 billion in assets (constant 2000 dollars) and five banking subsidiaries.  
Twenty years later, there are far fewer MBHCs but they are bigger in terms of assets.  In 2006, 
the “average” MBHC held approximately $11.6 billion in assets (constant 2000 dollars) and 
three subsidiaries.  Finally, because financial modernization has expanded the scope of activities 
permissible to banking companies, the percentage of assets devoted to nonbanking activities 
(such as insurance and brokerage) has risen steadily over the past decade (Figure 3).  To the 
extent that these activities are conducted in separate nonbank subsidiaries, they are beyond the 
reach of FDIC’s cross-guarantee authority.
The net effect of these structural changes and financial modernization on the utility of cross-
guarantees is hard to determine.  Because of the beneficial effects of scale, scope, and geographic 
diversification, the average MBHC in 2006 is likely to be less risky than its 1986 counterpart.46
In effect, MBHCs are likely to be more resilient than they were 20 years ago.  Offsetting these 
diversification benefits is the increase in concentration risk with a MBHC.  The average MBHC 
in 2006 has a larger lead bank (larger relative to both the BHC and its affiliated banks) and fewer 
bank affiliates.  To some extent, this disparity between the size of the lead bank and the number 
of bank affiliates changes the nature of the cross-guarantee—from mutual support to more of a 
one-way guarantee.  That is, the losses incurred from the failure of a non-lead bank subsidiary 
can be guaranteed by a healthy lead bank affiliate, but not vice versa.  In sum, the effects of 
diversification make it less likely that the cross-guarantee authority will be needed, but if it 
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becomes applicable in the case of a lead bank failure, there is a good chance that the guarantee 
will cover a smaller percentage of the deposit insurance fund’s losses.
Although changes in the concentration and nature of MBHCs have evolved in a way that has 
negative implications for the use of the FDIC’s cross-guarantee authority, there is little doubt 
that the authority does exert some measure of discipline on bank holding company management.  
Indeed, backed by the force of law, the cross-guarantee authority gives the FDIC (and the other 
bank regulators as well) a credible mechanism with which it can encourage a holding company 
to fix problem subsidiaries before they fail.  Moreover, the authority has certainly eliminated the 
loophole that allowed a BHC to pass its losses onto the deposit insurance fund while remaining 
independent.  Hence, in practice the FDIC can (and does) use its cross-guarantee authority much 
as the FRB envisioned using its expanded source-of-strength policy.
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Conclusion
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the failure of thousands of federally-insured depository institutions 
threatened the solvency of the deposit insurance system.  Both Congress and federal banking 
regulators reacted to the banking crises by attempting to expand liability for the costs of banking 
failures beyond the deposit insurance fund to the shareholders of entities that were affiliated with 
the failed institution.  In the 1980s, the Federal Reserve Board attempted unilaterally to broaden 
the scope of its source-of-strength policy by requiring bank holding companies to use all their 
available resources to assist their troubled or failing bank subsidiaries.  And in 1989, Congress 
provided the FDIC with the authority to impose a cross-guarantee liability on multibank holding 
companies for the costs of a failed subsidiary bank.  While there have been no recent failures 
upon which application of the FRB’s source-of-strength policy or the FDIC’s cross-guarantee 
authority might be judged, changes in the banking environment as a result of industry 
consolidation and financial modernization may have affected the strength and effectiveness of 
the policies going forward.    
The FRB’s authority to exercise its source-of-strength policy outside the application process has 
been constrained by legal challenges.  Moreover, FDICIA’s prompt corrective action provisions, 
while acknowledging a BHC’s responsibility to its banking subsidiaries, explicitly identify the 
circumstances in which a holding company is required to support its banking subsidiaries and set
a limit on the amount of the BHC’s responsibilities.
In contrast, the FDIC’s cross-guarantee authority has survived legal challenges to its use and has 
emerged with its legal standing firmly established.  And, in practice, the authority has proven to 
be an important regulatory tool for preventing and/or reducing losses to the deposit insurance 
fund. The FDIC has issued cross-guarantee assessments in nearly a dozen cases resulting in 
recovery of about a third of its estimated losses in those cases.  The FDIC has also used its cross-
guarantee authority to facilitate the sale or recapitalization (or both) of dozens of troubled banks.  
In at least two dozen cases, the FDIC was able to use its discretionary authority to grant 
conditional waivers from cross-guarantee liabilities in exchange for over $700 million in capital 
commitments to troubled bank subsidiaries.  Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests that the cross-
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guarantee authority has given the FDIC (and other bank regulators as well) a credible means with 
which to persuade the management of MBHCs (and their stockholders’) to dispose of a problem 
bank subsidiary before it fails.  In this respect, the cross-guarantee authority has evolved into an 
effective supervisory tool as well as an important mechanism for reducing losses to the deposit 
insurance fund during the failed-bank resolution process.  Nevertheless, the declining numbers of 
multibank holding companies and structural changes within MBHC themselves, suggest that in 
certain respects, the loss-sharing benefits of the cross-guarantee may be less significant than they 
have been in the past.
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 The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation.  Any errors are solely the responsibility of the authors.  The authors would like to thank Tim 
Critchfield, Ken Fitzgerald, Eileen Flynn, Catherine Hammond, Herb Held, Sarah Kroeger, Paul Kupiec, Lynn 
Shibut, and David Wall for their assistance.
1 The cleanup of the savings and loan industry would eventually require a taxpayer contribution of nearly $130 
billion (Curry and Shibut, 2000).
2 Under the original definition, banking institutions were commonly controlled if they were controlled by the same 
company or one depository institution was controlled by another depository institution.  12 U.S.C. § 1815(e)(9)(A) 
(2001), amended by the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–351, § 703, 120 Stat. 
1966, 1986 (2006).
3 Because the laws applicable to savings associations and banks differ and because the FRB’s source of strength 
policy only applies to bank holding companies, this paper speaks to the effect of the source of strength policy and 
the cross-guarantee provision on FDIC-insured banks unless otherwise stated.
4 See, for example, Mid-Continent Bancorp., 52 Fed. Res.  Bull. 198, 200 (1966).
5 Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234 (1978) (First 
Lincolnwood).
6 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (a)(1) (Reg. Y).
7 52 Fed. Reg. 15,707 (1987).  The policy statement provides that failure of a BHC to serve as a source of strength to 
its subsidiary banks will be considered an unsafe and unsound banking practice or violation of Regulation Y, 
resulting in issuance of a cease-and-desist order or other enforcement action.  Id.
8 Reported in BNA (1989).
9 Current regulatory capital categories are defined and discussed in detail in Appendix A.
10 52 Fed. Reg. 15,707 (1987).
11 Deal, Thompson, and Ross (1995) at 269.  Former FDIC Chairman L. William Seidman wrote that a clear conflict 
of interest existed in the American banking system of the 1980s because the system allowed directors of a bank 
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holding company to also serve as directors for some or all of the BHC’s subsidiary banks.   Bank directors are 
required by law to maintain the safety and soundness of the bank.  Yet, if they served also as directors of the holding 
company, then they could be sued by shareholders and creditors of the holding company for transferring money into 
a failing bank subsidiary when it was not in the best interest of the holding company.  Failure to support an ailing 
subsidiary bank, however, made them liable to federal banking regulators under the source of strength policy.  
Seidman (1993) at 55-57; Bierman and Fraser (1993) at 307.
12 Broome (1993) at 941.  Although limited liability is often considered in the context of protecting individual 
shareholders, the law also applies to legal entities such as bank holding companies.
13 Bierman and Fraser (1993) at 269; L. William Seidman, then Chairman of the FDIC, testified that “legislatively 
mandating that holding companies act as a ‘source of strength’ to their affiliated organizations could undermine the 
goals of limited corporate liability envisioned by having separate bank affiliates.  If such ownership burdens are 
mandated by Congress, they would make investment in bank equities unattractive” (cited in Deal, Thompson, and 
Ross [1995] at note 61).
14 Bierman and Fraser (1993) at 300–304.
15 Focusing on the period 1986-1998, Ashcraft (2004) finds that distressed banks that are controlled by a MBHC are 
about 8 percent more likely to receive an infusion of equity than other distressed banks.  Expanding holding 
companies, on the other hand, are more than 10 percentage points more likely to inject capital into a subsidiary, 
conditional on holding company size and strength.  In this study, distressed banks are defined as having a CAMEL 
rating of 3, 4, or 5.  CAMEL ratings are a confidential supervisory measure of bank financial condition.  Ratings are 
on a scale of 1-5, with a rating of 1 being the best.
16 MCorp Financial, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 900 F.2d 852, 853 (5th Cir. 1990).
17 For additional detail about the MCorp case, see FDIC (1998).
18 The FRB also brought an administrative action against MCorp for violations of § 23A of the Federal Reserve Act 
by causing two of the closed banks to provide unsecured extensions of credit to bank holding company management.  
The details of this proceeding are not germane to the present discussion.
19 In re MCorp, 101 B.R. 483 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
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20 MCorp Financial, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, 900 F. 2d 852, 861 (5th Cir. 1990).  The 
Fifth Circuit distinguished the holding in First Lincolnwood (see discussion at footnote 2) because in First 
Lincolnwood the Supreme Court was only reviewing the FRB’s authority to approve an application to form a BHC, 
not its authority to regulate the day-to-day financial soundness of the subsidiary banks.
21 MCorp at 863.
22 Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991), remanded to  958 F.2d 615 
(5th Cir. 1992).  
23 Failure of any company having control of a bank to fulfill a guarantee of the capital restoration plan subjects the 
bank to civil money penalties or other judicial or administrative enforcement actions.  12 C.F.R. §308.204(b)(2)-(c) 
(2006).
24 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e)(E)(i) (2001).  See Appendix A for details on PCA and its capital standards.
25 See, for example, Bierman and Fraser (1993).
26 Written Agreement By and Among Baltimore Bancorp, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond and Bank 
Commissioner State of Maryland, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, No. 92-051-WA/RB-HC 
(Aug. 5, 1992).
27 See, for example, Bies (2006) (“the Federal Reserve follows the general principle that bank holding companies 
should be a source of strength for their subsidiary banks”); Olson (2005) (“the Board has discouraged BHCs from 
using debt to finance the acquisition of banks or nonbank companies because high levels of debt at a parent BHC 
can impair the parent’s ability to serve as a source of strength to its subsidiary banks”); and Written Agreement 
dated February 24, 2004, between Cowboy State Bancorp, Inc. and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.
28 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), sec. 206(e)(1) (codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 1815(e)(2001), amended by Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 703, 
120 Stat. 1966, 1986 (2006).
29 Bovenzi and Muldoon (1990).  
Before the passage of FDICIA in 1991, the FDIC was bound by a cost test that required only that the resolution 
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method chosen for a particular bank be less costly than a deposit payoff and liquidation of the bank.  There was no 
requirement that the FDIC use the “least costly” resolution method.  That pre-FDICIA standard allowed the FDIC to 
consider non-cost objectives more fully when resolving failed banks.  After the full implementation of FDICIA in 
1992, the FDIC was required to resolve all failed institutions with the “least costly” method, although an exemption 
was allowed for cases found to pose unacceptable systemic risks.  12 U.S.C. § 1823©(4)(2001).
30 A recent study in a leading economic journal documents that bank failures (including the failure of healthy banks 
precipitated by the use of the cross-guarantee authority) are followed by permanent declines in real economic 
activity (Ashcraft [2005]).
31 For additional detail on the First Republic case, see FDIC (1998).
32 FDIC Board of Directors Meeting, August 24, 1989 and October 12, 1989.  The FDIC Board of Directors has sole 
discretion to waive liability in the case of an affiliated or unaffiliated party of an institution in default or in danger of 
default.  To communicate how it will use this discretion, the FDIC has issued the following guidelines for waiver 
consideration: a conditional waiver will be considered (1) when the exemption would facilitate an alternative that 
would be in the best interests of the FDIC; (2) if an affiliated institution is otherwise solvent, well-managed, and 
viable; and (3) in cases when an insured institution is sold to an acquirer that had no financial interest in the 
institution before the acquisition (FDIC Statement of Policy Regarding Liability of Commonly Controlled 
Depository Institutions, 63 Fed. Reg. 44765 [August 20, 1998]).  When FIRREA and its cross-guarantee provision 
were enacted, Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez stated, “[O]ne of the purposes of the waiver authority . . . is to give 
the FDIC sufficient flexibility to facilitate the acquisition of a financially distressed bank by a bank holding 
company” (135 Cong. Reg. H5301 [daily ed. August 4, 1989]).  
33 Loss estimates are made at the time of the first failure of an affiliated institution within the multibank holding 
company.
34 For a more detailed discussion of these cases, see FDIC (1998), Part 2: Case Studies.  Settlements were reached in 
the cases of Southeast Bank and First City Bancorporation.  As part of the settlements, the plaintiffs agreed to drop 
all challenges relating to the constitutionality of the FDIC’s cross-guarantee authority.  Additional details of the 
settlements can be found in the aforementioned cite.
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35 Another BNE affiliate, the Connecticut Bank and Trust, failed simultaneously with BNE because of losses on 
federal funds it had lent to the lead bank.  As a formal matter, Connecticut Bank and Trust also received a notice of 
assessment, but the notice was only intended to preserve the FDIC’s claims in the resolution.
36 Branch v. FDIC, 69 F.3d 1571 (D.C. Cir.), reh’g en banc denied (Feb. 7, 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. (1996).
37 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (Nov. 12, 1999).
38 Congress directs the FRB to consult with the Secretary of the Treasury when considering whether any new 
activities may be performed within an FHC. (12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(2) (2001)).
39 FRB (2003), 6.
40 As an umbrella supervisor, the FRB oversees the operation of a financial holding company on a comprehensive 
basis, while regulation of each subsidiary is left to its functional regulator.   The functional regulator is the 
appropriate government entity based on the type of business.  For example, in our hypothetical bank holding 
company (table 1A and table 1B), the FRB is the umbrella supervisor of the entire organization.  If Bank A and 
Bank B are national banks, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is their functional regulator.  The 
functional regulator of the nonbank subsidiary is dependent on its type of business—if it is a securities subsidiary 
then the Securities and Exchange Commission is the functional regulator, while an insurance subsidiary is regulated 
by the appropriate state insurance agency.
41 The section of GLBA that restricts the use of the source-of-strength doctrine does not use the term “financial 
holding company” when defining the limits of the FRB’s power but, rather, places limits on the FRB’s use of the 
doctrine as far as “bank holding companies” are concerned (12 U.S.C. § 1844(g) (2001)).
42 Greenspan (1999).
43 H.R. 6, 102d Cong., 1st sess. (1991).
44 Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351 § 703, 120 Stat. 1966, 1986 (2006).  
Nonbank holding companies are holding companies that do not qualify as bank holding companies under the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956 because the institutions they control do not meet the statutory definition of “bank.”
45 Riegle-Neal was enacted in 1994, but nationwide interstate banking through the holding company structure was 
prohibited until June 1995 and interstate branch banking was allowed after September 30, 1997.  Notwithstanding 
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Riegle-Neal, prior to 1995, several states permitted multibank ownership in limited circumstances—a situation that 
sometimes resulted in bank ownership being allowed across regional groups of states.
46 This assumes of course that banks choose not to increase their risk levels in response to these risk-reducing 
benefits.
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Table 1A. A Hypothetical Multibank Holding Company
MBHC – Parent Company Only Balance Sheet
                                        Millions of Dollars
ASSETS
Cash and Securities 100
Equity Investments in Bank A Subsidiary 900
Equity Investments in Bank B Subsidiary 100





MBHC Capital       200
Table 1B. A Hypothetical Multibank Holding Company
               
  Balance Sheet of Subsidiaries
Bank Bank Nonbank
A B Subsidiary
                                     Millions of Dollars
Total Assets 10,000 1,000 500
Total Liabilities   9,100   900 400
Total Equity Capital   900 100 100
Regulatory Capital 
Requirement 800 80 0
Excess Regulatory +100   +20    +100
Capital
Table 2A.  Hypothetical Scenario: Bank A of MBHC 
Writes Off $200 Million in Bad Loans
         Balance Sheet for MBHC Subsidiaries 
Bank Bank Nonbank
A B Subsidiary
                                                  Millions of Dollars
Total Assets 9,800 1,000 500
Total Liabilities 9,100 900 400
Total Equity Capital 700 100 100
Regulatory Capital
Requirement 800 80 0
Excess Regulatory Capital   -100  +20    +100
Table 2B.   Hypothetical Scenario: After Write-Off of
         $200 Million in Bank Equity
      
MBHC – Parent Company Only Balance Sheet
                                                           Millions of Dollars
ASSETS
Cash and Securities 100
Equity Investment in Bank A Subsidiary 700
Equity Investment in Bank B Subsidiary 100





MBHC Capital                                      0
Table 3. Number and Assets of BHCs and FHCsa
                    (Millions of dollars, not seasonally adjusted)
               Yearb
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
  Number of BHCs 1,727 1,842 1,979 2,134 2,254 2,288
  Total Assets of BHCs $6,745,836 $7,486,952 $7,991,161 $8,880,661 $10,339,839$11,237,913
  Number of FHCs 309 399 446 464 488 485
  Total Assets of FHCs $5,000,287 $6,062,284 $6,537,747 $7,320,870 $8,838,955 $9,681,256
  FHC total assets as a 
   percentage of BHC assets 74.1% 80.9% 87.3% 82.4% 85.5% 86.1%
aBHCs that obtain FHC status are essentially a subset of total BHCs.  Hence, the total numbers and assets for BHCs 
include the totals for FHCs.
  bAs of December 31.
Source: FRB (2006).  
Table 4. Number and Assets of FDIC-Insured Banking Organizations 
Thrifts and One-Bank Multibank 
    Independent Banks Holding Companies Holding Companies
       Date Number Assets Number Assets Number Assets TOTAL
($Billions) ($Billions) ($Billions) ($Billions)
Dec. 1988 7,399 $1,803 4,916 $512 973 $2,422 $4,737
Dec. 1989 6,793 1,641 4,919 562 953 2,524 4,727
Dec. 1990 6,287 1,404 4,872 619 962 2,626 4,649
Dec. 1991 5,853 1,266 4,872 648 921 2,630 4,544
Dec. 1992 5,484 1,182 4,804 669 878 2,685 4,536
Dec. 1993 5,093 1,131 4,656 696 850 2,881 4,708
Dec. 1994 4,687 1,120 4,524 692 838 3,209 5,021
Dec. 1995 4,282 1,115 4,483 670 820 3,556 5,341
Dec. 1996 3,955 1,097 4,428 778 822 3,737 5,611
Dec. 1997 3,635 1,075 4,464 902 792 4,068 6,045
Dec. 1998 3,379 1,090 4,399 932 745 4,509 6,531
Dec. 1999 3,253 1,172 4,369 1,069 733 4,643 6,884
Dec. 2000 3,152 1,329 4,396 1,294 699 4,840 7,463
Dec. 2001 3,004 1,433 4,444 1,373 654 5,064 7,869
Dec. 2002 2,856 1,456 4,503 1,614 606 5,367 8,436
Dec. 2003 2,716 1,508 4,549 1,694 577 5,874 9,075
Dec. 2004 2,584 1,642 4,566 1,861 555 6,602 10,106
Dec. 2005 2,522 1,770 4,597 2,056 522 7,051 10,877
Appendix A
FDI Act: Section 38, Prompt Corrective Action (codified 12 USC 1831o)
The prompt corrective action (PCA) provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) were intended to minimize losses to the deposit 
insurance funds by requiring federal banking regulators to promptly and forcefully 
respond to an insured depository institution’s deteriorating financial condition and 
possible failure.  Section 38 provisions require federal regulators to institute actions 
whenever an institution fails to meet minimum capital levels.
More specifically, section 38(c) created a capital-based framework for bank and 
thrift supervision that places a depository institution into one of five capital categories.  
Table A.1 shows the minimum capital levels for each of the five categories defined by 
section 38(c).  Institutions are considered undercapitalized if their ratios fall below 8 
percent Total Risk-Based Capital or 4 percent Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital or 4 percent 
Leverage Capital.  Institutions that do not meet these minimum capital requirements are 
subject to increasingly restrictive and prescriptive supervisory actions.  For example, 
section 38(e) mandates that federal regulators require undercapitalized depository 
institutions to (1) submit capital restoration plans; (2) restrict growth of assets; and (3) 
obtain prior approval for additional acquisitions, branches, and new lines of business.  
Under section 38(f), depository institutions that are classified as significantly 
undercapitalized face additional restrictions on transactions with affiliates and interest 
rates paid on deposits.  When an institution becomes critically undercapitalized, federal 
regulators must, within 90 days, either appoint the FDIC as receiver or take other action 
to minimize potential losses to the deposit insurance fund.
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Well capitalized 10 percent or more and 6 percent or more and 5 percent or more
Adequately
capitalized 8 percent or more and 4 percent or more and 4 percent or more
Undercapitalized Less than 8 percent or Less than 4 percent or Less than 4 percent
Significantly 
Undercapitalized
Less than 6 percent or Less than 3 percent or Less than 3 percent
Critically
Undercapitalized
An institution is critically undercapitalized if its tangible equity is 2 percent 
or less regardless of its other capital ratios.
Source:  Section 38 of the FDI Act and 57 Federal Register 44866-01.
Definitions
Leverage Capital Ratio—Tier 1 risk-based capital divided by [average total assets less 
disallowed intangibles].
Risk-Weighted Assets—Assets adjusted for risk-based capital definitions that include 
on-balance-sheet items as well as off-balance-sheet items multiplied by risk weights that 
range from zero to 100 percent.
Tangible Equity—Tier 1 capital plus outstanding cumulative perpetual preferred stock 
less all intangible assets except mortgage-servicing assets.
Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio—Tier 1 capital divided by total risk-weighted assets.
Tier 1 Capital—Also known as core capital; the sum of common stockholders’ equity 
(common stock and related surplus, undivided profits, disclosed capital reserves, foreign 
currency translation adjustments, less net unrealized losses on available-for-sale 
securities with readily determinable market values), noncumulative perpetual preferred 
stock, and minority interest in consolidated subsidiaries, minus intangible assets, 
identified losses, investments in securities subsidiaries subject to 337.4, and deferred tax 
assets in excess of the limit set forth in section 325.5(g) of the FDIC’s rules and 
regulations.
Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio—Total reported risk-based capital divided by total risk-
weighted assets.
Table B.1.  Cross-Guarantee-Related Failures, Assessments, and Recoveries.
Name of Institution Location Date of Original Cross-Guarantee Cross-Guarantee Final Loss to 
Failure Loss Estimate Assessment Recovery the BIF
TransTexas Bancshares
First State Bank (1) Pflugerville, TX 8/24/1989 5,823,000 na na 8,778,425
First National Bank of Canton Canton, TX na na 5,823,000 waiver (4) na
Greater Texas Bancorporation
Greater Texas Bank Southwest (1) Austin, TX 11/30/1989 7,658,000 na na 4,032,499
First National Bank of San Marcos  (2) San Marcos, TX 1/4/1990 22,891,238 0 0 22,822,907
First National Bank of Georgetown (2) Georgetown, TX 5/17/1990 19,050,513 7,658,000 0 40,534,986
Bank of New England Corp.
Bank of New England (1) Boston, MA 1/6/1991 1,015,900,000 na na 573,422,751
Connecticut Bank and Trust (3) Hartford, CT 1/6/1991 783,554,000 378,015,000 0 1,258,111,680
Maine National Bank (3) Portland, ME 1/6/1991 112,550,000 98,985,000 29,685,602 66,394,517
The One Bancorp
Maine Savings Bank (1) Portland, ME 2/1/1991 143,855,000 na na 10,146,518
Southstate Bank for Savings (2) Brockton, MA 4/24/1992 15,800,000 0 0 10,457,323
The Bank of Hartford (2) Hartford, CT 6/10/1994 0 285,873,000 0 295,688,750
Premier Bancshares of Texas
Texas Premier Bank of Victoria Victoria, TX 6/13/1991 1,750,000 na na 1,245,218
Bank of Kerrville Kerrville, TX na na 1,340,000 1,340,000 0
The First Coastal Corporation (5)
Suffield Bank  (1) Suffield, CT 9/6/1991 88,419,000 na na 83,633,087
Coastal Savings Bank Portland, ME na na 89,804,637 settlement na
Southeast Banking (5)
Southeast Bank (1) Miami, FL 9/19/1991 143,000,000 na na 0
Southeast Bank of West Florida (3) Pensacola, FL 9/19/1991 0 143,000,000 143,000,000 0
Cenvest
Central Bank (1) Meriden, CT 10/18/1991 151,852,000 na na 242,063,008
Meriden Trust and Safe Deposit Meriden, CT 7/7/1994 na 151,852,000 7,987,415 143,362,134
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Name of Institution Location Date of Original Cross-Guarantee Cross-Guarantee Final Loss to 
Failure Loss Estimate Assessment Recoveries the BIF
First City Corporation (5)
First City - Dallas (1) Dallas/Houston 10/30/1992 144,600,000 na na 0
First City - Houston (1) Dallas/Houston 10/30/1992 288,000,000 na na 0
First City - Beaumont (3) Beaumont, TX 10/30/1992 5,100,000 26,105,000 26,105,000 0
First City - Bryan (3) Bryon, TX 10/30/1992 0 26,105,000 26,105,000 0
First City - Graham (3) Graham, TX 10/30/1992 132,000 26,105,000 26,105,000 0
First City - Lufkin (3) Lufkin, TX 10/30/1992 2,651,000 26,105,000 26,105,000 0
First City  - Madisonville (3) Madisonville, TX 10/30/1992 967,000 26,105,000 26,105,000 0
First City - Midland (3) Midland, TX 10/30/1992 7,219,000 26,105,000 26,105,000 0
First City - Orange (3) Orange, TX 10/30/1992 3,695,000 26,105,000 26,105,000 0
First City - San Angelo (3) San Angelo, TX 10/30/1992 2,518,000 26,105,000 26,105,000 0
First City - Tyler (3) Tyler, TX 10/30/1992 5,100,000 26,105,000 26,105,000 0
First City - Sour Lake (3) Sour Lake, TX 10/30/1992 220,000 26,105,000 26,105,000 0
First City - Austin (3) Austin, TX 10/30/1992 28,000,000 26,105,000 26,105,000 0
First City - Lake Jackson (3) Lake Jackson, TX 10/30/1992 914,000 26,105,000 26,105,000 0
First City - El Paso (3) El Paso, TX 10/30/1992 18,100,000 26,105,000 26,105,000 0
First City - Kountze (3) Kountze, TX 10/30/1992 0 26,105,000 26,105,000 0
First City - Alice (3) Alice, TX 10/30/1992 2,207,000 26,105,000 26,105,000 0
First City - Aransas Pass (3) Aransas Pass, TX 10/30/1992 2,977,000 26,105,000 26,105,000 0
First City - Corpus Cristi (3) Corpus Cristi, TX 10/30/1992 4,000,000 26,105,000 26,105,000 0
First City - San Antonio (3) San Antonio, TX 10/30/1992 18,400,000 26,105,000 26,105,000 0
Eastland Financial Corporation
Eastland Savings Bank (1) Woonsocket, RI 12/11/1992 47,835,000 na na 10,303,042
Eastland Bank (3) Woonsocket, RI 12/11/1992 0 47,835,000 650,556 16,925
Ameritex Bancshares Corporation
American Bank of Haltom City (1) Haltom City, TX 2/5/1993 9,799,000 na na 14,480,026
American Bank of Commerce Grapevine, TX na na 0 waiver (4) na
Riverbend Bank Fort Worth, TX na na 3,607,000 waiver (4) na
TOTAL 2,048,491,000 1,683,682,637 652,553,573 2,785,493,795
Notes:
1)  Name of institution whose failure resulted in cross-guaranty being applicable.
2)  Institution failed on its own accord, not related to cross-guaranty assessment.
3)  Institution failed simultaneously because of cross-guaranty assessment.
4) Cross-guarantee assessment was waived; see Table B.2 for details.
5) The case was litigated and a settlement was reached.
Table B.2.  The Disposition of Actual and Potential Cross-Guaranty Liability in Selected Cases.




















First State Bank of Pflugerville was sold via a 
purchase and assumption transaction (P&A) for a 
premium of $26,000—reducing the estimated 
$5.85 million loss to the amount assessed against 
FNB of Canton.
The First National Bank of Canton received a 
waiver of its cross-guaranty liability in order to 
preserve the value of a TransTexas promissory 
note held by the Special Asset Bank of NCNB, TX
(the FDIC held 51percent of NCNB).  The $7.6 
million note was eventually sold for $871,000.  
The FDIC determined the sale value of the note 
was greater than the potential recovery from the 









Conditional waiver issued; in exchange the two 
institutions received capital injections totaling 
$7,450,000 and the FDIC was granted warrants 















Bank failed of its own accord on 5/03/90.
Bank failed of it own accord on 9/27/90.
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Bank failed of its own accord on 6/28/90.
Bank failed of its own accord on 9/24/90.
Conditional waiver issued; estimates indicated an 
additional loss of $4.4 million to the FDIC if First 
State Bank were to fail.  The waiver allowed for sale 
of the bank with approximately $350,000 of the 






Eagle Pass, Laredo, 
Rockdale
$617,084,000
Conditional waiver issued for all three institutions as 
part of a broader settlement in which the holding 
company agreed to inject $1.5 million in additional 
capital into the banks.
United Bankers, Inc.
Waco, TX
United Bank of Waco
Waco, TX
8/02/90




Waiver denied (8/14/90).  The FDIC considered 
recapitalization of the bank to be improbable and 
failure likely in the near term.  No evidence that 
deposit insurance fund losses would be increased by 















Bank failed of its own accord on 5/10/91; waiver 
request returned.
Conditional waiver approved on 11/26/91 to 
facilitate the sale and recapitalization of the bank.  
The buyers injected $4 million in new capital and 
the FDIC received payments of $80,750 to offset 
losses from the failure of the other affiliates.  The 
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bank eventually failed of its own accord (9/18/92).
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SouthState failed of its own accord on 4/24/92 with 
an additional estimated loss of $15,848,000 to the 
BIF.
Prolonged negotiations for settlement ceased when 










Settlement agreement signed on 11/24/94 wherein 
the bank would receive an immediate capital 
contribution of $200,000 and the FDIC would 
receive non-voting perpetual preferred stock that 
would represent, on conversion, 95 percent of the 
common shares of the bank—stock sold later at par 

















American Bank of Haltom City was resolved 
through a P&A transaction that was deemed least 
costly to the deposit insurance funds.  The sale was 
estimated to save $2.5 million in losses vs. a 
liquidation and deposit payoff.
Conditional waiver granted to facilitate the sale of 
the bank.  The FDIC received $1.7 million in 
compensation for its interests in the bank.
First waiver request denied.  Conditional waiver 
subsequently granted to facilitate the change of 
control and recapitalization of the bank.  
Controlling interest in Riverbend was eventually 
sold for $200,000 and an additional capital 
contribution of $110,000.
Table B.3. Cross-Guarantee-Related Cases—Conditional Waivers and Exemptions






MBank – Corpus 
Christi, TX
MCorp 09/18/90 2.5 Waiver approved to facilitate sale conditions on injecting $2.5 million in 
capital to MBank – Waco.
MBank –
Brownsville, TX
MCorp 12/18/90 13.0 Waiver approved to facilitate sale conditions on injecting $5.3 million in 
capital to Mbank – Waco and $7.7 million to Mbank – El Paso.
MNC Financial, 
Baltimore, MD
MNC Financial 01/14/91 290.0 Waiver approved in exchange for pledge to downstream $290 million to 
subsidiary banks (Maryland National Bank and American Security Bank).
MBank – Waco, 
TX
Ford Bank Group 05/28/91 15.0 Waiver approved to facilitate sale conditional on injection $15 million in 
additional capital.
MBank – El Paso, 
TX
MCorp 08/06/91 12.3 Waiver approved to facilitate sale and recapitalization of MBank – El Paso 
with conditions to inject $12 million in additional capital to MBank – El 
Paso and $300,000 to MBank-New Braunfels.
Republic National 
Bank, Phoenix, AZ
Dakota Bankshares 03/13/91 1.0 Granted conditional waiver for sale of Republic National Bank to Dakota 




Pharaon/BCCI 09/27/91 100.0 Waiver approved to secure $100 million in new capital for Independence 




na 10/09/91 2.0 Waiver approved to facilitate a $2 million recapitalization of Douglas Bank, 
KS; Douglas Bank is a minority-owned institution.
First State Bank, 
Overton, TX
Overton Financial 11/05/91 0.0 Waiver approved to facilitate purchase of Lindale State Bank, Lindale, TX.






11/05/91 14.0 Waiver granted to facilitate the sale and recapitalization of State Home 






11/05/91 12.0 Waiver granted to facilitate the purchase and recapitalization of Palisade 
Savings Bank; purchase price of $12 million.
Banco Santander 
Puerto Rico, San 
Juan, PR





Keystone Holdings 04/07/92 0.0 Waiver approved to facilitate purchase of 15 percent of the common stock 
of Family Savings Bank, FSB, Los Angeles, CA.
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09/30/92 0.0 Waiver granted to facilitate purchase of Howard Savings Bank, Newark, NJ; 
this is a loss-sharing transaction that the FDIC determined to be necessary 
and least costly.
Peoples State Bank, 
Clyde, TX
na 10/06/92 0.0 Waiver approved to facilitate sale of Freedom Bank of Ranger, TX; a 
subsidiary of Freedom Bank Group, which is in default; first case of open 
bank assistance since FDICIA; FDIC contributes $360,970 in cash in 
exchange for 50 percent of the collections from all charged-off debts.
Moultrie National 
Bank, Moultrie, GA
na 12/15/92 0.0 Waiver approved in exchange for consulting, support services, and a 
purchase option.





12/22/92 30.0 Waiver approved to facilitate purchase of Pacific First Bank and to obtain a 
$30 million recapitalization of Lincoln Savings Bank, NY, NY.





06/11/93 0.0 Waiver approved to facilitate sale to First Union Corporation.




08/17/93 0.45 Waiver approved to facilitate sale in exchange for $450,000 in additional 
capital injection.




07/26/94 2.85 Waiver approved to facilitate change in control and to obtain a $2.85 capital 
million injection.
Peoples Savings Bank, 
New Britain, CT
na 11/01/94 7.8 Waiver approved to facilitate the P&A of New Meriden Trust and Safe 
Deposit Company—a bridge bank.  The purchase price included a premium 
of $7.8 million.
First State Bank of El 
Dorado, El Dorado, IL
El Dorado 
Bancshares
07/22/97 2.0 Waiver approved to facilitate sale wherein El Dorado Bancshares agrees to 






08/11/98 5.0 Waiver approved to facilitate sale wherein First Baird Bancshares injects $5 






01/13/04 0.0 Waiver issued to facilitate sale of First National Bank of Goliad, Goliad, 
TX.
TOTAL 709.90
